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Abstract
Trajectories are spatio-temporal traces of moving objects which
contain valuable information to be harvested by spatio-temporal
data mining techniques. Applications like city traffic planning,
identification of evacuation routes, trend detection, and many
more can benefit from trajectory mining. However, the trajec-
tories of individuals often contain private and sensitive informa-
tion, so anyone who possess trajectory data must take special care
when disclosing this data. Removing identifiers from trajectories
before the release is not effective against linkage type attacks,
and rich sources of background information make it even worse.
An alternative is to apply transformation techniques to map the
given set of trajectories into another set where the distances are
preserved. This way, the actual trajectories are not released,
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but the distance information can still be used for data mining
techniques such as clustering. In this thesis, we show that an
unknown private trajectory can be reconstructed using the avail-
able background information together with the mutual distances
released for data mining purposes. The background knowledge is
in the form of known trajectories and extra information such as
the speed limit. We provide analytical results which bound the
number of the known trajectories needed to reconstruct private
trajectories. Experiments performed on real trajectory data sets
show that the number of known samples is surprisingly smaller
than the actual theoretical bounds.
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Mekan-Zaman Yörüngelerinin Yayınlanmasında Gizlilik Açıkları
Emre KAPLAN
Bilgisayar Bilimi ve Mühendisliği, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2009
Tez Danışmanı: Yar. Doç. Dr. Yücel Saygın
Anahtar Kelimeler: Gizlilik, mekan-zaman verisi, hareket yörüngeleri, veri
madenciliği
Özet
Hareket yörüngeleri, hareketli objelerin içerisinde değerli bilgiler içeren
zaman-mekan izleridir. Bu bilgiler çeşitli veri madenciliği uygulamalarında
kullanılmak üzere toplanırlar. Şehir trafiğinin planlanması, acil ulaşım yol-
larının belirlenmesi ve akım takibi gibi bir çok uygulama hareket yörüngesi
madenciliğinden faydalanır. Kişilere ait hareket yörüngeleri sık sık kişiye özel
ve hassas bilgiler içermektedir. Bu bilgilere sahip kişiler, veriler açıklanmadan
önce gerekli özeni göstermelidir. Kişisel belirteçlerin, bu veriler açıklanmadan
önce temizlenmesi de bağlaç tipi saldırılara karşı zayıf kalmaktadır ve zen-
gin arka-plan bilgileri ile bu zayıflık daha da belirginleşmektedir. Bu konuda
bir alternatif, bilgileri açıklamadan önce dönüşüm teknikleri kullanarak, ver-
ilen bir küme hareket yörüngesini, ikili uzaklıkları korunacak şekilde bir
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başka kümeye dönüştürmektir. Bu şekilde gerçek hareket yörüngeleri açık-
lanmamakta fakat ikili uzaklık bilgileri hala kümeleme gibi veri madenciliği
uygulamalarında kullanılabilmektedir. Bu çalışmada, bilinmeyen ve özel bir
hareket yörüngesinin, veri madenciliğinde kullanılmak üzere açıklanan ikili
uzaklık bilgileri ve kullanıma müsait arka-plan bilgileri ile çözülebileceği gös-
terilmektedir. Bahsedilen arka-plan bilgisi, bilinen bazı hareket yörüngeleri
ve hız sınırı ek bilgileri biçimindedir. Çalışmada ayrıca, özel hareket yörün-
gelerini çözmek için bilinmesi gereken hareket yörüngeleri sayısı hakkında
analitik sonuçlar da sunulmaktadır. Gerçek hareket yörüngesi veritaban-
larında yapılan deneyler bilinmesi gereken hareket yörüngeleri sayısının ol-
ması gereken teorik sınırlardan şaşırtıcı derecede küçük olduğunu göstermek-
tedir.
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1 Introduction
Today’s world highly benefits from the wireless technologies which are in de-
mand for the last 15 years. Since mid 90’s, wireless technologies have been
developed together with various services and applications. As a result, peo-
ple became more and more mobilized with mobile phones and the wireless
trend is widely adopted. Today, mobile phones and personal digital assis-
tants (PDA) are also equipped with Global Positioning Systems (GPS), Wi-fi,
Bluetooth, and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags. As these tech-
nologies become part of our life, a lot of time-referenced location information
is collected by different mobile service providers. Time-referenced location
data is also called spatio-temporal data, where “spatio” means the location,
and “temporal” means related to time. The collected spatio-temporal data
contains valuable information to be harvested by spatio-temporal data min-
ing techniques for various applications such as traffic management, identifica-
tion of evacuation routes, trend detection, geo-marketing, and sometimes for
geo-spamming. In general, spatio-temporal data can be analyzed to discover
new patterns about how people travel and behave in public areas. However,
privacy is a major concern for data mining in general and spatio-temporal
data mining in specific. Privacy issues become even more serious when the
data miner and the data owner are different, and they have to share the data
for data mining, or when organizations publish their data for public use. For
example, GSM companies with the capability of collecting huge amounts of
spatio-temporal data about their users which shows where they have been at
specific times and what are their habits etc. Therefore, companies who col-
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lect privacy sensitive spatio-temporal data also have the obligation to protect
the privacy of their customers. Therefore, they need mechanisms to harvest
useful information from their data while protecting the privacy of individu-
als. Privacy concerns are not solely the subject of spatio-temporal datasets
but also in data mining context for conventional data. However, existing
methods, developed for conventional data such as tabular data cannot be
directly applied to spatio-temporal datasets. Moreover, privacy threats for
spatio-temporal data are different and more diverse than conventional data.
In order to preserve individual privacy, the first attempt would be to remove
the personal identifiers from the spatio-temporal data collected before it can
be disclosed to third parties or made public. However, this has been shown
that simply removing the identifiers is not enough, since some of the remain-
ing attributes in the data set could be used to join the public and private
information as discussed in [48]. Availability of rich background information
makes the privacy issues more complicated [50] and this is even more serious
in case of spatio-temporal data considering the variety of background infor-
mation to be used. A safer approach may be to perturb the data before it is
made public, as discussed in [40], or apply transformations on the data in a
way that preserves important properties such as pair wise distances among
the data points so that data mining techniques such as clustering can still be
applied. However, there may still be privacy risks in such transformations
on spatio-temporal data. In this thesis, we consider distance preserving data
transformations on trajectories and identify the privacy leaks in such trans-
formation when an adversary has background information. We propose two
different methods to show that private trajectories could be discovered with
2
very high precision. For both methods, we consider the following scenario
where the adversary would like to reconstruct the movement behavior of a
specific individual (the so called “target trajectory”) and knows the released
set of pair wise distances between the trajectories in the dataset. We assume
that the trajectories themselves are not published but only their pair wise
distances are available for data mining purposes. In both methods, we show
that target trajectories can be found very precisely with limited background
information and using computationally feasible methods. Contributions of
this thesis are listed below:
1. We have shown that publishing pair wise distances between data points
leads to privacy leaks.
2. Easy accessible background information in addition to pair wise dis-
tances enhances the attack quality and results in very precise solutions
leading to further privacy leaks.
In the first method, the adversary has access to some background information
such as the average speed, or the maximum speed of the trajectory and
a bunch of trajectories from the dataset together with access to released
pair wise distances. The adversary reconstructs the target trajectory with
a heuristic based algorithm. Due to limited information, he/she may not
exactly recover the target trajectory but can still figure out the basic shape
of the route. Experiments show that even with very limited information in
terms of number of trajectories, the adversary can reconstruct the target
trajectory precisely in most of the cases. As a qualitative measure we discuss
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the relation between reconstruction quality of the target trajectory and the
number of trajectories the adversary has.
In the second method, the adversary only has a bunch of trajectories and
access to published pair wise distances between trajectories of the dataset
which is going to be attacked. This method is not solely an alternative
attack method but has advantages over the first one in the sense that:
1. It is faster than the previous method.
2. Target trajectory can be discovered and the solutions are mathemati-
cally sound however, due to the limited information, one can generate
various numbers of candidates which are all identical in terms of dis-
tances to the known trajectories and equally possible to be the target
trajectory.
3. This method results in a set of trajectories which enables us to do
several other observations such as the confidence about the areas that
the target trajectory possibly passed through. Area where the most of
the results are passing through is likely to be also passed by the target
trajectory. We calculate confidence of those areas in terms of number
of results found in the attack.
The thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 focuses on background infor-
mation and related work done in the area of privacy and spatio-temporal
data mining. In Section 3, we cover the definitions, notations and the for-
mal problem definition addressed in this thesis. In Section 4 we discuss our
4
first attack method, in Section 5 we discuss our second attack method. We
conclude in Section 7 and discuss the future works.
5
2 Background and Related Work
The contributions of this thesis are in the research area of privacy in spatio-
temporal data mining. In this chapter, we survey several other related re-
search areas as well. These are privacy preserving data mining, anonymiza-
tion and privacy in spatio-temporal data. In this section, we provide the
basics and related work about these topics. We start by defining what is
privacy and why it is important for this research and continue covering other
topics listed above.
2.1 Privacy In Data Mining
Privacy is defined in [4] as,
“Privacy is the ability of an individual or group to seclude them-
selves or information about themselves and thereby reveal them-
selves selectively.”
Privacy rights are developed almost in all countries so that utilizing personal
data is not an easy task. Disclosing information other than what the data
owner has selected to share is called privacy leak and should be avoided. Pri-
vacy is important because of the growing number of emerging technologies in
mobile area, vast number of spatio-temporal data is collected and data min-
ing applications harvest valuable information out of those huge data heaps.
The key point is: does the collected information contain more than what
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the individual decide to disclose? For example, no one can be traced unless
stated otherwise but what about collected GPS data or RFID tag data of that
individual? Are those data points just innocent points or more than that?
In spatio-temporal data mining, collected data points are utilized in various
techniques to decide or create meaningful results out of those considerable
amounts of data. When information from various sources come together, un-
expected data disclosure may result and cause privacy leaks. In [18, 19, 34]
authors discuss when the results of data mining applications cause privacy
violations.
2.2 Privacy Preserving Data Mining
Privacy preserving data mining is a very popular research area since the
beginning of 2000’s. A large number of collected data needs well designed
algorithms to be utilized. As discussed in 2.1, utilizing personal information
is not an easy task. Privacy preserving algorithms are needed to preserve
individual privacy while utilizing data as in ordinary data mining techniques.
Agrawal and Srikant’s work [9] in this area lead other researchers to focus
on privacy aspects of data mining. The basic method in privacy preserving
data mining is to remove personal identifiers and other sensitive information
in a way that the data will not be linked to its owner. In [49], authors
worked in association rule hiding such that sensitive information is concealed.
Another way is to do Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) on vertically
or horizontally partitioned data. In [32, 30], authors developed such methods
based on SMC.
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2.3 Privacy In Spatio-Temporal Data
Privacy in spatio-temporal data is another popular research area in recent
years. Location based services (LBS) are very popular in today’s world which
are discussed in [10, 14, 41, 15]. Mobile applications often use location infor-
mation and service according to client’s location. In [10], authors propose a
way to express users preferences on their location information and obfuscate
the data to preserve privacy.
Data perturbation is a well-studied field in data privacy in[10, 33, 37, 40]
which researchers studied on perturbing the data in a way that preserve
privacy. Indeed, several other papers have treated this topic, showing that
data perturbation techniques are not always effective in protecting privacy
[37] because the perturbation can be predictable.
Anonymization is another research subject aiming at protecting individ-
ual privacy. Anonymization based privacy preserving methods are discussed
in [48, 8, 46, 6, 23, 14]. Techniques for trajectory anonymization were re-
cently proposed in [8] and [46], but privacy risks after data release were not
considered. In another recent work, privacy risks due to distance preserving
data transformations were identified [51], however spatio-temporal data was
not addressed. The privacy risks in trajectory data was addressed in [50]
where authors point out how parts of a trajectory could be used as quasi-
identifiers to discover the rest of the trajectory. In this work, authors assume
that the trajectories are distributed vertically across multiple sites where
sites are curious to learn the rest of the trajectory, and the authors propose
8
methods to prevent that by suppressing parts of the trajectories before they
are published.
9
3 Preliminaries and Problem Definition
In this section, we provide the basic building blocks for the thesis. The meth-
ods covered in the following sections 4 and 5 uses the notations and definitions
expressed in this section. We first define the sample points, trajectory and
the notations, then we discuss the distance metrics and dissimilarity matrix.
Background information used in both methods are discussed followed by the
discussion of error and success rate measures. At last, we discuss the gradient
descent algorithm which is adopted our method discussed in Section 4.
3.1 Trajectories and Their Properties
Trajectories are paths in space-time. For every time frame, there is a space
(or say location) coordinates which are easily collected by GPS devices or
mobile phones nowadays. Hence, a trajectory can be represented as a set
of points, denoted as sample points. A sample point has 3 features namely,
x-coordinate, y-coordinate and time stamp, t. In this thesis, a discrete tra-
jectory is defined as a polyline represented as a list of sample points which
the time component is discarded for the sake of simplicity. We represent tra-
jectories in two different forms. A trajectory either represented as a column
vector which is described below or as a list of sample points. If we have more
than one trajectory then ith trajectory is denoted as T i. The list of sample
points representation of a trajectory is as follows:
10
T = ((x0, y0, t0), ....., (xn−1, yn−1, tn−1))
In this thesis, we assume that trajectories
1. are aligned.
2. have constant sampling rate (ti+1 − ti = 4t, for some constant 4t).
Algorithms for ensuring these conditions can be found in [28]. Time com-
ponent is discarded for the sake of simplicity and there are methods to have
constant sampling rate which makes time component redundant, so we rep-
resent a trajectory as a list of (x, y) coordinates (or a vector in R2n). We
write Ti to represent the ith sample-point (xi, yi, ti). In most of this thesis, we
think of a trajectory as a column-vector in a large vector-space. We use calli-
graphic letters to refer to the vector representation of a trajectory. The vector
representation of a trajectory T is: T = (x0, y0, t0, . . . , xn−1, yn−1, tn−1)T ∈
R3n. In this case Ti is the ith element of the vector (i.e. T0 = x0,T1 =
y0, . . . ,T3n−1 = tn−1). A trajectory T can posses many properties which are
of interest in different situations, such as maximum and average speed of a
trajectory, closest distance to certain locations, duration of longest “stop”, or
percentage of time that T moves “on road”. We use average and maximum
speed property of trajectories in the first method in Section 4, so we discuss
these properties in the following subsections..
In this thesis, we also define known, target, candidate and reconstructed
trajectory. Definitions of those trajectories are below.
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Known trajectory is the trajectory known by the adversary to be used
in the privacy attacks as the key information. In our methods, the
adversary generally has a bunch of trajectories known from the dataset
where s/he attacks to.
Target trajectory (or private trajectory) is the trajectory which the ad-
versary wants to find. Target trajectory is naturally a member of the
dataset where the adversary attacks to. Target trajectory denoted as
T ′ and X .
Reconstructed trajectory is the trajectory which is the only outcome of
the attack. This term is used in the first method that we discuss in
Section 4.
Candidate trajectory is the trajectory which is one of the outcomes of the
attack. Due to limited information, there are more than one trajectory
in general, satisfies the conditions in terms of knowledge of the adver-
sary. Candidate trajectories are possible representatives of the target
trajectory although they may not be similar on a map but mathemat-
ically they satisfies all the conditions as the target trajectory does and
none of them is better than the others. Candidate trajectory i is de-
noted as ci. This term is used in the second method that we discuss in
Section 5.
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3.2 Distance Metrics and Dissimilarity Matrix
3.2.1 Distance Metrics
The most important property of the trajectories that our work relies on, is the
distance property. Distance is the numeric value which defines the closeness
of two data points. The distance metric can be any of the metrics defined
below but for the sake of simplicity we chose Euclidean distance. However
when comparing trajectories in terms of their relative distances, using real
Euclidean distances or distance square values doesn’t matter since we care of
the relative distances of those points hence we use Euclidean square distance
defined below. Moreover omitting square root operation saves computation
results in speed because methods presented in this thesis extensively do this
operations. There are some distances metrics in the literature[45]. The dis-
tance metrics used throughout this work is listed below. Note that Euclidean
distance and P-norm distance are using the vector representation so that their
indices are in range of [0, 2n− 1] while rest of the distance metrics are using
list of sample points representation so that their indices are in the rage of
[0, n− 1]
Euclidean distance
‖T −T ′‖2 =
√√√√2n−1∑
i=0
|Ti −T ′i |2 (3.1)
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P-norm distance
‖T −T ′‖p =
(
2n−1∑
i=0
|Ti −T ′i |p
)1/p
(3.2)
Average p-norm distance
ASDp(T, T
′) =
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
‖Ti − T ′i‖p (3.3)
Variance distance
dv(T, T
′) =
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
(‖Ti − T ′i‖2 − d2(T, T ′))2 (3.4)
Euclidean-Square distance
‖T − T ′||2 =
n−1∑
i=0
|Ti − T ′i |2 (3.5)
Area distance dA(T, T ′), which is the area of the region enclosed between
the two trajectories [45].
Note that the average sample distance is a special form of average p-norm
distance where p = 2. In this thesis, we mainly focus on Euclidean distance
and square of Euclidean distance which we defined above.
3.2.2 Dissimilarity Matrix
Data holders want to do privacy preserving data mining so that instead
of publishing actual data points (trajectories in this thesis) they publish the
14
pairwise distances of the data points so the information in terms of data min-
ing is contained in the distances in-between data points. The list of pairwise
distances of all trajectories to each other are represented in the matrix form,
where D(i, j) represents the distance between ith and jth trajectory in the
matrix D. This is called dissimilarity matrix also mentioned in [35, 36, 51].
An example of a dissimilarity matrix is given below.
Dataset:
Trajectory 1: [(1,1)(2,2)(3,3)]
Trajectory 2: [(2,1)(3,2)(4,3)]
Trajectory 3: [(2,3)(3,4)(4,5)]
Distances:
D(2,1) =
√
3
D(3,1) =
√
15
D(2,3) =
√
12
Dissimilarity Matrix, D
1 2 3
0
√
3
√
15
- 0
√
12
- - 0
Figure 1: Dissimilarity Matrix
Dissimilarity matrix is denoted as D and a pairwise distance between
trajectory i and trajectory j is denoted as D(i, j).
3.3 Types Of Background Information
3.3.1 Known Distances
The most important property of the trajectories that we use in this thesis is
the known distances. Known distances are in the form of dissimilarity matrix
defined in Section 3.2.2 which is the only released information that includes
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the distance from an unknown trajectory T to a fixed trajectory, T ′ for all
trajectories in the dataset and accessible by the adversary. This data may
be release in order for a third party to perform clustering on the trajecto-
ries. Calculating distance in between trajectories is discussed in Section 3.2.
When using a continuously differentiable norm to compute the distance be-
tween T and T ′ we obtain a continuously differentiable property of T ; e.g.
∆T ′(T ) = d(T ′,T ) is continuously differentiable. Note that all these dis-
tance measures are continuously differentiable with the exception of p-norm
distance for odd p.
3.3.2 Average and Maximum Speed
Another property of trajectories, which is natural to consider, is the max-
imum or average speed at which the moving object is traveling. Since we
only have discretized versions of the trajectories, with sample points taken
at a fixed sample rate, we can only approximate the average and maximum
speed:
avgSpeed(T ) =
1
n− 1
n−1∑
i=0
‖Ti − Ti+1‖2
∆t
(3.6)
maxSpeed(T ) = max
i
{‖Ti − Ti+1‖2
∆t
}
(3.7)
where ∆t is the known, constant sample rate (which we have discarded from
the description of the trajectory itself). Note that the average/max speed
in this case is approximated by the average/max speed of each segment of
the discretized trajectory, where segment i is the line segment (Ti, Ti+1),
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or, when written in the vector notation: ((T2i,T2i+1), (T2i+2,T2i+3)). The
average speed is easily seen to be continuously differentiable. To compute the
derivative of the maxSpeed, first note that the derivative of the maximum
function can be approximated as:
∂
∂xi
max{x0, . . . , xn−1} =
 1 for i ∈ argmaxi{x0, . . . , xn−1}0 else (3.8)
where argmaxi{x0, . . . , xn−1} = {i1 . . . , il} is the set of indices such that xij
has the largest value of {x0, . . . , xn−1} (more than one element can have the
maximum value).
When there is more than one largest argument to the max function, the
partial derivatives with respect to those arguments are not well-defined (the
right-derivatives are 1, while the left-derivatives are 0). However, in the
following, we will use the convention that the partial derivatives of the largest
arguments are 1 in those arguments.
Let S be the set of indices of the first sample points on the fastest segments
of the trajectory: S = argmaxi{‖Ti − Ti+1‖2/∆t}, and let St = {2s + t|s ∈
S}, t ∈ {0, . . . , 3} be the sets of the indices of the coordinates of the vector
representation of the fastest segments (S0 is the set of x-coordinates on the
first sample points, S1 is the set of y-coordinates on the first sample points,
S2 is the set of x-coordinates on the second sample points, etc.). In the
following we will use a generalization of Kronecker delta: δi,S , which is 1 if
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i ∈ S, and 0 otherwise. The partial derivatives of the maximum speed is:
∂
∂Ti
maxSpeed(T ) =
∂
∂Ti
max
j
{‖Tj − Tj+1‖2
∆t
}
=
3∑
k=0
δi,Sk
1
∆t
∂
∂Ti
‖(Ti−k,Ti−k+1)− (Ti−k+2,Ti−k+3)‖2
=
3∑
k=0
δi,Sk
1
∆t
Ti − (−1)δk,{0,1}Ti+2 − (−1)δk,{2,3}Ti−2
2‖(Ti−k,Ti−k+1)− (Ti−k+2,Ti−k+3)‖2
This partial derivative is not continuous, however, as we argue in Section 4.4,
it is still suitable for the reconstruction of trajectories.
3.4 Error and Success Rate of a Trajectory
3.4.1 Error
We define the “error” of a candidate X ′ as
E(X ′) =
1
2
m∑
i=1
(
Pi(X
′)− Pi(X )
)2 (3.9)
where Pi are the properties which are known about the target trajectory (in
other words: Pi(X ) are known values). The error function is the difference
between the given properties of the target trajectory, X , and corresponding
properties of the candidate trajectory, X ′. The error function is 0 when
the properties of the candidate and the target trajectory are the same and
a positive number, otherwise. Furthermore, the error function is positive. It
is differentiable as long as the properties are differentiable.
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The error function is defined for the adversary to measure how well s/he
uses background information. It depends on only the information that the
adversary has.
When the adversary uses the hyper-lateration technique with an adequate
number of trajectories, it exactly finds the target trajectory. But in general,
due to lack of information, the target trajectory may not be found exactly so
the adversary needs to calculate the difference between the target trajectory
and the candidate trajectory in terms of their properties. This measure is
called error and error of a reconstructed trajectory shows how much the
reconstructed trajectory differs from the target trajectory. Any zero of the
error function exhausts the knowledge (i.e the known properties) about the
target trajectory. Equation 3.9 is a general error definition defined over
trajectories with any number of properties. In Equation 3.10, error of a
candidate trajectory is calculated over its only known property, the distances.
E(X ′) =
i=n∑
i=1
(||X ′ − Ti||2 − δi)2 where δi = ||X − Ti||2 (3.10)
In Equation 3.10, error is defined over the known distances. It shows
how well the candidate trajectory, X ′, satisfies known distances to all the
Ti’s. It calculates the squared differences between the distance from candi-
date trajectory, X ′, to known trajectory, Ti, and δi. Note that δi represents
the distance of the known trajectory Ti from the target trajectory X. This
tells us something about how far the candidate trajectory is from the target
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trajectory. The error function in 3.10 is 0 when the candidate trajectory is at
δi to the known trajectory Ti for all i ∈ {1, .., n}, and a positive number oth-
erwise. Figure 2 depicts how to find error on a 2d plane on ordinary points.
The logic behind the calculations is the same in trajectories because trajec-
tories with n sample points are just points in R2n. In Figure 2, black point
denotes the candidate trajectory, gray point denotes the known trajectory
and finally red point denotes the target trajectory. According to Equation
3.10, summation calculates d1 and δi calculates d2 so the overall error equa-
tion, E(X ′), calculates d1 − d2 which denotes the error between the target
trajectory and the candidate trajectory. This is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Error
3.4.2 Success Rate
In essence the success depends on how well the candidate represents the
target.
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In [35] an unknown target trajectory was reconstructed from knowledge
of the distance from the target trajectory to each trajectory in a set of known
trajectories. To evaluate the success of the reconstruction the following suc-
cess rate was used:
SR(X ′) = 1− ‖X −X
′‖2
δmin
(3.11)
where δmin = mini(δi) is the smallest known distance. This success-rate is 1 if
the method findsX precisely, 0 if it returns the closest known trajectory, and
negative if it performs worse than just returning the closest known trajectory.
This measure has a number of shortcomings, which makes it difficult to
compare the success of different algorithms, or even the same algorithm, but
applied to different datasets. One obvious problem is that the success rate
cannot be applied to reconstruction methods which do not use the distance to
known trajectories. Furthermore, it is very difficult to obtain a high success
rate for a dataset with many close trajectories (since δmin is likely to be
a very small number). Another problem is that this success does not take
the “resolution” of the target trajectory into account: For fixed length target
trajectories the success rate does not depend on the number of sample points.
If the target trajectory has a high sample rate (high resolution) it is likely
that the quality of the reconstruction is more sensitive to noise than if the
same target trajectory only has a low resolution.
We overcome some of the shortcomings of the old success measure by
defining a new success rate SR(X ′) of a candidate trajectory. The success
rate should satisfy the following properties:
• SR(X ′) ∈ [0, 1]
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• SR(X ) = 1
• Depend only on the target and candidate trajectories.
• Be independent of the magnitude of coordinates.
Intuitively the quality of a candidate trajectory depends on how far away
the candidate trajectory is from the target trajectory at any given time. In
our case, since we assume that trajectories are aligned, the average distance
of the candidate trajectory to the target trajectory over time is the average
sample distance:
ASDT (X) =
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
‖Xi − Ti‖2 (3.12)
The average sample distance alone, however, is not a good measure of success,
since it depends highly on the magnitude of the coordinates. To factor out
this dependency on the magnitude of the coordinates, we divide the average
sample distance with the total length of the target trajectory, which can be
computed as:
‖T‖l =
n−2∑
i=0
‖Ti − Ti+1‖2 (3.13)
The fraction ASDT (X)/‖T‖l is a non-negative real number, which is 0
when X = T . We define the success rate from this fraction as follows:
SR(X ′) = e−αASDT (X)/‖T‖l (3.14)
where α is a sensitivity factor which decides how steep the success rate goes to
1 as the candidate approaches the target. The new success rate satisfies the
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criteria listed above: SR(T ) = e−αASDT (T )/‖T‖l = e0 = 1, and as ASDT (X)
tends to infinity, SR(X) tends to e−∞ = 0.
The success measure defined above may not be appropriate in all situa-
tions for instance when the trajectories may be laying on top of each other,
thus giving the visual impression of a perfect match, but may be very far
apart in time: Even though all sample points overlap, the chronological or-
dering may be reversed, this situation will give a very poor success rate with
the measure defined above, but will appear as a perfect match.
All in all, success rates aim to evaluate the attack methodology in the
point of view of the researcher. That is, both success rates involves the target
trajectory which is an unknown information to the adversary. Success Rate
1 depends on the target trajectory, candidate trajectory and some known
distances from the dissimilarity matrix (i.e the the distance of the closest
known trajectory to the target). Success Rate 2, however, depends only
on the target and the candidate trajectory and overcomes the shortcomings
discussed above.
Lower Bound of Success Rate Although the adversary cannot know
the final success rate before the attack, there are situations where s/he can
give a lower bound on the success rate. Since the success rate is defined in
terms of the average sample distance, s/he can get the following bound in the
situation where s/he knows the average sample distance to a set of known
trajectories.
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Theorem 1 Let T 1, . . . , Tm be known trajectories, and let δi = d2(T i, X) be
the average sample distances to the unknown trajectory X. Then, for any
trajectory X ′ with E(X ′) = 0 the success rate is:
SR(X ′) ≥ e−2αδmax/(n‖X‖) (3.15)
where δmax = maxi(δi) is the largest given distance, and E is the error func-
tion defined in Eq. 3.10.
While the attacker does not know the length of X, he may be able to
estimate it from his background knowledge.
Proof . We first observe that since E is a sum of the non-negative terms
1/2(d2(T
i, X ′)− δi)2, and since E(X ′) = 0, necessarily d2(T i, X ′) = δi.
Now, note that for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
ASDX(X
′) =
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
‖X ′i −Xi‖2
=
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
‖X ′i − T ki + T ki −Xi‖2
≤ 1
n
n−1∑
i=0
(‖X ′i − T ki ‖2 + ‖T ki −Xi‖2)
=
1
n
(d2(T
k, X ′) + d2(T k, X))
=
2δk
n
.
24
Inserting this in the definition of the success rate gives us:
SR(X ′) = e−αASDX(X
′)/‖X‖l ≥ e−2αδk/(n‖X‖l) (3.16)
Since Eq. 3.16 is true for all δk, it is true for δmax. 
3.5 Problem Definition
Location information is collected by GSM companies and the adversary also
has a mobile phone and has his/her own trajectories in the dataset. This
way s/he naturally has some information from the dataset. S/he also knows
the pairwise distances of his/her trajectories to the other trajectories because
that information is contained in the dissimilarity matrix defined in Section
3.2.2 which is published for data mining purposes hence s/he will be capable
of calculating target trajectories from the dataset.
Formally, given a dataset D, with cardinality c, and a set of trajectories
from this dataset, say k trajectories (and k ≤ m), and pairwise distances of
those k trajectories to the target trajectory, then the adversary can compute
the target trajectory. In [51], a target trajectory can be found by hyper-
lateration technique (see Section 5.3.2) but it requires a high number of
known trajectories, which may be infeasible. Assume that trajectories in
the data set have 500 sample points, the method presented in [51] needs
2n + 1 trajectories where n is the number of sample points in trajectories,
hence 2 ∗ 500 + 1 = 1001 trajectories and corresponding pairwise distances
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are needed. However knowing high number of trajectories and their pairwise
distances may be infeasible. The first method discussed in Section 4 aims
to lower this high number of known trajectories needed to be known by
the adversary. Actually 2n + 1 known trajectories is indeed not needed in
many cases because a heuristic based method can find very precise candidate
trajectory with a very limited information.
We built another method discussed in Section 5 on top of the hyper-
lateration technique where we use interpolation technique discussed in Sec-
tion 5.3.1 in between sample points of a trajectory so that we lower the need
of high number of trajectories because of the facts that the trajectories are
aligned and constant sampled as discussed in Section 3.1. Trajectory data is
mostly collected by GPS data, which are from mobile vehicles, that follows up
certain paths and roads. When the resolution of the data is low, trajectories
have high linear dependencies between the sample points that follows each
other. In this fashion, if we know two points, we can guess the other points
in-between those points because the sampling is constant (i.e time difference
between points is constant) and it is possible to guess more or less how long
distance covered during the time between two sample points hence the points
in-between can be predictable up to some degree depending on the structure
of the trajectory. As the trajectory is more linear, the trajectory or part of
the trajectory can be more predictable. We use linear interpolation for the
sake of simplicity and trajectories themselves are set of lines because they
are denoted as a set of sample points so each pair of sample points forms a
line so that the points in-between those sample points should be on that line
unless the collected data is noisy.
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4 Discovering Private Trajectories Using Back-
ground Information
4.1 Introduction
In this attack method, we consider the following scenario: A malicious person
wishes to reconstruct the movements (the “target trajectory”) of a specific
individual. Besides a released set of mutual distances between a data set
of trajectories, which contains the target trajectory, the attacker has some
background information, such as the average speed or maximum speed of the
trajectory, and some of the other trajectories in the data set. We propose
a concrete algorithm which can reconstruct the target trajectory from this
information.
We demonstrate that trajectories can be reconstructed very precisely with
very limited information using relatively simple methods. In particular we
apply our method to two real-world data-sets. In one data-set, containing
the trajectories of private cars in Milan, we can reconstruct an unknown
trajectory with 500 sample points by knowing its distance to only 60 known
trajectories. This is in sharp contrast to the 1001 known distances which
would be needed to solve the corresponding system of equations to find the
unknown trajectory.
We propose a method which can reconstruct trajectories from a very
wide range of continuous properties (see Section 2); the method of known
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distances is only a special case. We show that any property of T which
can be expressed as a continuously differentiable function f : R2n → R
can be used to reconstruct T . Our method is optimal in the sense that it
will eventually find a candidate which exhausts all the information available
about the target trajectory.
4.2 Reconstructing Trajectories
We consider how a malicious person can find an unknown trajectory, X,
with as little information as possible. Any information we have about X
may improve our ability to reconstruct X; a car does not drive in the ocean,
and rarely travels at a speed of more than 200 km/h. The information which
the malicious person has about a trajectory can be divided into two kinds:
1. Data which has been released into the public domain by a data holder
(in some anonymized format)
2. Background information which the malicious person already had about
the trajectory.
In this thesis, the only kind of released information we address are the mutual
distances between trajectories. This data may be release in order for a third
party to perform clustering on the trajectories. Examples of background
information are maximum speed of a trajectory, since speed limits are well-
known.
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With a sufficient number of known properties of X, the trajectory can be
fully reconstructed. For example, if 2n linear properties of X are known, we
have a system of 2n linear equations. Solving these 2n equations gives us the
exact unknown trajectory. The number of linear properties we need to know,
however, is at least as large as the number of coordinates in the trajectory
itself. If only m 2n+ 1 linear properties are known, the solution will be in
a (2n−m)-dimensional subspace, at best. When the candidate can only be
restricted to a subspace, it can be arbitrarily far away from X. If the known
properties are non-linear, finding a solution to the corresponding equations,
even if sufficient number of properties is known, may even become infeasible.
As an example, consider m known trajectories, T 1, . . . ,T m, and m cor-
responding positive real values δi, where
δi = ‖X −T i‖2 (4.1)
for unknown trajectory X . Our task is to find an approximation X ′ which
minimizes the distance ‖X −X ′‖2. This can be done by hyper-lateration, a
generalization of trilateration. By squaring the known distances we obtain a
system of n quadratic equations: δ2i =
∑2n−1
i=0 |Ti − T ′i |2, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
However, by subtracting each of these equations from the first equation we
obtain n− 1 linear equations:
δ21 − δ2i = ‖X −T 1‖22 − ‖X −T i‖22 (4.2)
⇒ δ21 − δ2i =
2n∑
j=1
2Xj(T
i
j −T 1j ) + (T 1j )2 − (T ij )2 (4.3)
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for i ∈ {2, . . . , 2n+ 1}. As previously argued, this approach is unsatisfactory
since we need to know at least (2n+1) distances where a trajectory may have
thousands of sample points so that obtaining (2n+ 1) distances is infeasible
in many cases, and the method is too sensitive to noise.
As seen from the discussion above, we need a method which can recon-
struct the unknown trajectory with considerably fewer known properties than
coordinates. However, the best thing is to find a candidate trajectory which
has the same properties as the properties we know aboutX . If, for instance,
the only information we have about X , is a car driving at an average speed
of 50 km/h in Athens, then any X ′ which moves along the roads of Athens
at 50 km/h is a possible solution. We use the error measure defined in Sec-
tion 3.4 to calculate the difference between the given properties of X , and
the corresponding properties of the candidate X ′; in the case above, the
distances to the known trajectories because we want to minimize the error so
that the candidate trajectory with lowest error is simply the best candidate
trajectory.
4.3 Noise
The information available to the attacker about the unknown trajectory may
not always be precise but subject to noise and the noise is either a deliberate
attempt from the data holder to anonymize the released data, or simply errors
in the background knowledge of the attacker such as dissimilarity matrix,
known trajectories or average / maximum speed.
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It is important to note the difference between noise in the original mea-
surement of trajectories, and noise which is added before data is released.
Noise due to measurements does not affect the attack method but affects the
quality of the data because for instance if there is a noise in trajectories, then
the dissimilarity matrix built also includes that noise and the distance values
will be according to the noisy data so that the the trajectory we reconstruct
will not be the real target trajectory without noise but the target trajectory
in the dataset which is noisy. Noise can also be added to published data delib-
erately to prevent beaching the privacy of individuals. Data perturbation is
a well-studied field in data privacy [40]. As an example of deliberately added
noise, consider a trajectory database which releases the pairwise distances of
all trajectories that it contains. The distances of these trajectories have to
satisfy the triangle inequality however, if the noise is added independently to
each of the released distance, the distances will no longer satisfy the triangle
inequality.
We consider the case of known distances, where the attacker knows m
trajectories, T 1, . . . ,T m, and m corresponding distances:
δi = ‖X −T i‖2 + i (4.4)
where i are noise terms.
When the equations known to the attacker have errors as above, recon-
struction based on solving the system of equations by hyper-lateration as
described in Section 4.2 does not work well. On the other hand, if the noise
follows a distribution with an expected value of 0, a reconstruction method
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based on optimization should still perform well, since the real solution is
likely to be close to the solution of the erroneous equations. In Section 4.5,
we show that our method can handle additive noise which follows a Gaussian
distribution up to a certain standard deviation.
4.4 Our Reconstruction Method
We adopt the steepest descent (gradient descent search) algorithm to find a
candidate with minimum error.
The error-function in Equation 3.10 has value 0 exactly when the candi-
date trajectory has the same properties as the known trajectory Ti, for all
properties Pi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Furthermore, since Equation 3.10 is a posi-
tive valued function, the target trajectory is a global minimum. There may,
however, be more than one global minimum, as well as several local minima;
but any zero of the error-function exhausts the knowledge we can possibly
have about the unknown trajectory, given the known properties. Recall that
the gradient descent algorithm finds a zero of a positive and continuously
differentiable function E as follows
1. Choose a random point, x0, in the domain of E.
2. Iteratively define xi+1 = xi − γ∇E(xi), for some step-size γ > 0.
3. When xi+1 = xi (∇E(xi) = 0) a (local) minimum has been reached. If
E(xi) = 0 we have a global minimum (since E is non-negative), and
we stop. Otherwise, we go back to step 2.
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Note that the size of the steps taken in the direction of the gradients are
determined by the step size, γ. Ideally, the attack should neither underesti-
mate nor overestimate the step size. If the step size is too small, the attack
will converge very slowly, thus yielding poor success rate, whereas if the step
size is too large the attack takes big steps and possibly overshoots the target,
which again yields a poor success rate. Also note that gradient descent is
not the most efficient algorithm for solving this kind of optimization problem.
However, the aim of this method is to demonstrate potential dangers in data
disclosure,.efficiency of the attack is out of the scope.
The gradient, ∇E(X ′), depends on the differentiable properties Pi, i ∈
{1, . . . ,m}:
∂
∂X ′i
E(X ′) =
m∑
j=1
(
Pi(X
′)− Pi(X )
) ∂
∂X ′i
Pj(X
′) (4.5)
If all properties are continuously differentiable, then the gradient is a contin-
uous function in the candidate trajectory.
Recall that not all partial derivatives of the maximum speed property
are continuous. The discontinuity happens when more than one segment are
equally fast, and are the fastest segments. However, since we defined the
derivative to be one in this case, the gradient descent will still change the
speed of these segments until they satisfy the known maximal speed.
33
4.5 Evaluations and Experimental Results
To validate our reconstruction method, we have designed three different tests,
and applied them on two datasets of real-world GPS data. One data set con-
sists of routes of school busses in Athens and it represents a more predictable
data set since busses will usually follow the same routes. The second data
set is obtained in the context of the GeoPKDD project and it consists of the
GPS tracks of a set of cars in the city of Milan in Italy. GPS tracks of cars are
definitely less predictable since there are many routes that they can follow.
In the first test, we let the reconstruction method run for many iterations
to see how the success-rate evolves over time. The second test consists of
several executions of the reconstruction algorithm on the same dataset, but
with a varying number of known trajectories and background information.
The aim of the second test is to verify the claim that an attacker can recon-
struct a target trajectory with only a few known trajectories. In the third
test, we apply Gaussian noise to the released distance data to see how fast
the success-rate diminishes in the face of errors.
The first dataset is named Athens dataset [20, 1]. This dataset contains
145 trajectories each with 1096 (x, y) sample points. The trajectories are
aligned with samples approximately every half minute on 108 different days.
This dataset is chosen because of its regularity, which enables us to test our
reconstruction algorithm in a near best-case scenario.
The second dataset, Milan dataset [2]. This dataset contains 135 trajec-
tories recorded with sample points at irregular intervals over a period of time
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of one week. The density of sample points of the Milan dataset is lower than
the dataset from Athens. Even though the trajectories in the Milan dataset
are not aligned, for the purpose of these tests, we assume that they are. This
assumptions only means that we are not working with the original trajecto-
ries, but trajectories which follow the same routes, but at different speeds.
The Milan dataset is much more complex than the Athens dataset, and is
chosen to test our reconstruction algorithm in a scenario which is much more
realistic (and relevant) than the Athens dataset.
For the purpose of testing the reconstruction method described in Sec-
tion 4.4 we implemented a limited version. In the implementation the step-
size γ is set to 1, and the implementation does not restart if a local maxima,
or saddle point is reached. Furthermore, we assume that the two datasets are
aligned, so that we can discard the time component. In all tests in this sec-
tion we report the success rate as defined in Equation 3.14. We have chosen
the smoothness parameter α = 20 based on visual impression from several
tests.
Even though efficiency is not a primary concern in this work, we remark
that it takes approximately 8 minutes to run the reconstruction method with
50 known trajectories from the Athens dataset for 60.000 iterations on a 1.7
GHz laptop.
35
4.5.1 Success-rate over Time
In the first test, we run the reconstruction method on the Athens dataset for
one million iterations to see how the success-rate evolves over time. Figure 3
shows the convergence speed of our reconstruction method. The success-rate
is an average value obtained from 5 runs of the reconstruction algorithm on
the Athens dataset with 50 known trajectories, where the target trajectory
is selected at random in each of the 5 runs. The x-axis shows the number of
iterations in log-scale.
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Figure 3: Success-rate vs. number of iterations for the Athens dataset. The
x-axis is in log-scale (Average of 5 experiments with 50 known trajectories).
Figure 4 shows the evolution of candidates in one experiment with the
Athens dataset and one with the Milan dataset. The test uses 60 known
trajectories from the Athens dataset, and 90 known trajectories from the
Milan dataset. Notice that a success-rate of 0.6 allows us to determine the
general area in which the target trajectory is moving, but not specific streets.
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With a success-rate of 0.85 it is possible to identify some, but not all, streets.
4.5.2 Success Rate with Background Information
In the second test, we fix the number of iterations used in the reconstruction
to 60.000, and measure the success-rate as a function of the information
available to the attacker. We run the reconstruction with a different number
of known trajectories, ranging from 10 to 140. We also run the reconstruction
both with and without background information about average and maximum
speed in the dataset. And finally we run the reconstruction with two different
distance measures: Euclidean distance, and average sample distance.
Figure 5 shows the success-rate attainable for different numbers of known
trajectories in the Athens dataset. Each sample is the average success-rate of
20 tests each running for 60.000 iterations. Both target and known trajecto-
ries are chosen at random in each test. The solid line shows the success rate of
the attack, when the attacker only uses the Euclidean distances between the
target and the known trajectories as the continuously differentiable proper-
ties. The dashed line shows the success rate, when the attacker assumes that
the target trajectory moves with an average and maximum speed similar to
the average and maximum speed of his known trajectories (see Section3.3).
The graph shows that for the case of the Athens dataset, using knowledge
about the average speed does not give extra success to the attack. However,
Figure 6 shows the same experiment for the Milan dataset, and here it is
clear that, for a low number of known trajectories, using knowledge about
the average speed gives a success rate up to 0.05 higher (for 20–40 known
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trajectories). From the result, we can see that simple background informa-
tion, such as average and maximum speed, can improve the accuracy of the
reconstruction when the quality of the trajectory data is poor (as in the Mi-
lan dataset), or in insufficient number of known trajectories are available.
However, for good quality trajectory data, the impact of simple background
information is not significant. We have only tested speed information, but
other kinds of background information may give a higher impact.
Figure 7 shows the success-rate attainable for different numbers of known
trajectories in the Athens dataset when the attacker knows the average
sample distance to his/her known trajectories. Each sample is the aver-
age success-rate of 20 tests each running for 60.000 iterations. Both target
and known trajectories are chosen at random in each test. Figure 8 shows
the same result for the Milan dataset. The success rate attained from these
tests shows that for our attack, knowing the mutual Euclidean distance is
stronger than knowing the mutual average sample distances.
4.5.3 Noise
Figure 9 shows the success-rate attainable in the face of errors in the known
distances. Independent and identically distributed Gaussian noise with a
mean value of 0 has been added to each distance known to the attacker. The
Gaussian x-axis of the figure shows the deviation of the noise as a fraction of
the average value of the distances. This means that for x = 1 approximately
32% of the distances are subject to noise with the same magnitude as the
distance itself.
38
(a) The 60 known trajectories for Athens. (b) The 90 known trajectories for Milan.
(c) Athens, Success-rate 0.60 (d) Milan, Success-rate 0.60
(e) Athens, Success-rate 0.85 (f) Milan, Success-rate 0.85
Figure 4: Evolution of the candidate trajectory in the Athens and Milan
datasets. 39
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Figure 5: Success-rate vs. number of known trajectories in the Athens
dataset with known Euclidean distances. With and without known average
and maximum speed.
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Figure 6: Success-rate vs. number of known trajectories in the Milan dataset
with known Euclidean distances. With and without known average and max-
imum speed.
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Figure 7: Success-rate vs. number of known trajectories for the Athens
dataset with known average sample distance.
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Figure 8: Success-rate vs. number of known trajectories for the Milan dataset
with known average sample distance.
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Figure 9: Success-rate for 40 known Euclidean distances subject to noise.
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4.6 Discussions
In this chapter, we consider distance preserving data transformations, and
assume that the mutual distances of trajectories are released rather than
the actual trajectories. We show that, even in such a scenario, the private
trajectories can be identified using background information such as known
distances and speed limits.
Experiments performed on these real data sets show that unknown private
trajectories with 1096 sample points can be reconstructed with an expected
success-rate of 0.8 by knowing the distance to only 50 known trajectories
while reconstructing the trajectory perfectly with “tri-lateration” would re-
quire 2193 known trajectories as studied in [51].
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5 Interpolation Based Private Trajectory Dis-
covery
5.1 Introduction
We discussed an attack model in which the adversary uses available back-
ground information such as average / maximum speed and those background
information played an important role in reconstructing trajectories (see Sec-
tion 4). In a scenario where the attacker knows some of the trajectories from
the dataset together with a released set of mutual distances in-between the
trajectories in the dataset, any unknown trajectory from that dataset can be
solved. In this chapter, we propose another attack algorithm which utilizes
the known trajectories together with the released set of mutual distances.
We solve any unknown trajectory mathematically no worse than the actual
target trajectory and any other possible solutions. Since the adversary has
limited information in terms of known trajectories to perfectly find the target
trajectory, s/he may or may not find the exact target trajectory. However
s/he can generate all possible solutions which clearly includes the target tra-
jectory itself. Comparing to the first method discussed in Section 4 which
finds an arbitrary solution, this method computes all the possible solutions.
The set of all possible solutions, so called candidate trajectories are utilized
to calculate the confidence of the sample points which the target trajectory
passes through with high probability. We define the confidence of an area as
the ratio of candidates passing through a specified sample point or area to all
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candidates. The number of candidate trajectories depends on how much in-
formation the adversary has. If the adversary has a very limited information,
the attack results in a vast number of candidates or even an infinite set of
candidate trajectories. We build our method on top of the hyper-lateration
technique which is also mentioned in [51]. The number of known trajectories
is less than the number of known trajectories in [51]. Because knowing a high
number of trajectories and their pairwise distances may be infeasible. Our
method works on trajectory data which is assumed to be aligned and have
constant sampling rate. This assumption enables us to use interpolation so
that some of the points can be imitated by interpolated points hence the
number of known trajectories needed is lowered.
This chapter can be outlined as follows:
1. The target trajectory can be solved and the solution is one of the math-
ematically possible candidates due to the limited information however
one can generate various number of candidates which are all identical in
terms of distances to the known trajectories so to construct candidate
trajectory set.
2. Confidence of an area can be calculated by utilizing the candidate tra-
jectory set to state how certain the target trajectory passes through
that area. This analysis is important because this method may not ex-
actly find the target trajectory but using all the solutions generated, it
can conclude with high confidence that the target trajectory is passing
through a specific area.
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5.2 Preliminaries
In this method, we assume that the trajectories follow up paths such as
roads and streets. Consecutive sample points should be close to each other
which makes interpolation meaningful in this context. Definitions of inter-
polated trajectory, distance preserving trajectory, candidate trajectory and
confidence of an area is discussed below.
Interpolated trajectory is a trajectory which a number of interpolated
points are added among its segments.
Distance preserving trajectory is a trajectory which the pairwise dis-
tances from the known trajectories is the same as the pairwise distances
of the target trajectory from the known trajectories.
Candidate trajectory is the result trajectory of the attack which is a
distance preserving trajectory that contains a number of interpolated
points.
Confidence of an area is the probability of the target trajectory passing
through a certain area. This area is selected to be a sample point, so
we discuss about the confidence of a sample point.
5.3 Underlying Methods and Techniques
First of all we don’t have enough information to solve unknown variables
unless we have enough equations. By re-writing some of the unknown vari-
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ables in terms of other points, we reduce the number of unknowns to solve.
We use linear interpolation to re-write some of the sample points from the
target trajectory. Once we have reduced the number of unknowns, we use a
modified hyper-lateration technique to find the target trajectory.
5.3.1 Interpolation Technique
Interpolation is used to create points in between two given points such that
they are expected to simulate a real life scenario. Trajectories mostly fol-
low paths such as roads which act like a line when the resolution is high.
That is, given a trajectory with considerable number of sample points, it is
likely that points follow each other closely. The distance between two sample
points in a trajectory depends on the sampling rate and the speed so the
points in-between two given points can be predicted by interpolation if the
sampling rate of the points are constant. Constant sampling rate is assumed
in this thesis (see Section 3.1). It will be fairly easy to interpolate the points
since the sampling of the points are constant, so given any two points, so
called main points and the number of points in-between main points, it is
possible to calculate those points in-between, so called interpolated points.
An interpolated point can be found from the main points using the formula
below.
Ij(i) =
(
T2i +
j(T2i+2 − T2i)
s+ 1
, T2i+1 +
j(T2i+3 − T2i+1)
s+ 1
)
, j = 1, 2, 3...s
(5.1)
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where Ij(i) is the jth interpolated point in the (i+1)th segment, T2i is the
2ith coordinate of the trajectory which we add interpolated points. Hence
the above formula calculates the x and y values of the Ij(i). Note that T2i
and T2i+2 corresponds to x values where as T2i+1 and T2i+3 corresponds to y
values of the main points which the interpolated points will lie in-between.
For example, in Figure 10, I1(0) is between main points A and B is the start
and end points of the first segment. The coordinates of A and B are T0, T1
and T2, T3 respectively.
Figure 10: Interpolation
In Figure 10, the black points denotes the main points which are fixed
while the grey points denotes the interpolated points. The points I1, I2, I3
are interpolated points in the segment 0 and calculated by Equation 5.1.
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5.3.2 Modified Hyper-lateration Technique
Hyper-lateration is a generalization of tri-lateration. It is a simple technique
to identify the exact location of a point. In tri-lateration, to identify a point
with 2 coordinates namely x and y, 3 other points and their distances to that
point are needed. A point in a 2 dimensional plane, R2, is found by 3 points
in R2. In Figure 11, an example of trilateration is shown. In Figure 11a,
the set of points r1, r2 away from the center of the circles are shown. The
points marked with a red circle show the points satisfying the condition so
that those points are r1, r2 away from the center of the circles but we don’t
know which one is the real solution. This is the case when we do not have
sufficient information about the target point so we can find more than one
solution as seen in this example. However in Figure 11b, the target point
is defined to be r1, r2, r3 away of the center of the 3 circles. This time 3
pairwise distances are enough to exactly specify the target trajectory hence
the unique solution is found. This example illustrates trilateration, so points
are 2d and in R2. As seen from this small example, in R2 we need 2 + 1 = 3
points to find the target exactly, anything less than 3 points results in more
than one solution.
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Figure 11: Trilateration
In general, to exactly identify a point in R2n, 2n + 1 points are needed.
Trajectories are high dimensional points in space, that is, a trajectory with
n sample points (2n coordinates) is a point in R2n. Hence a trajectory can
be exactly identified by 2n+ 1 points in R2n. The proposed attack methods
based on hyper-lateration, such as [51], needs 2n + 1 trajectories to solve
an unknown trajectory. This can be done by squaring the known distances
(which are in Euclidean distances, so they become Euclidean square distances
defined in Section 3.2.1) a system of n quadratic equations is formed such
that δ2i = ||T − T ′||2 =
∑2n−1
i=0 |Ti − T ′i |2, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Subtracting
each of these equations from the first equation yields n− 1 linear equations.
Note that X , T denotes the sample point representation, X,T represents the
vector representation of the trajectories.
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δ21 − δ2i = ‖X − T 1‖2 − ‖X − T i‖2 (5.2)
=
n−1∑
j=0
‖Xj − T 1j ‖2 −
n−1∑
j=0
‖Xj − T ij ‖2 (5.3)
Assume that the point X1 is on the line segment |X0,X2|. If X1 is an
interpolated point denoted as I1(0), then Equation 5.2 reduce to
δ21 − δ2i = ‖X0 − T 10 ‖2 − ‖X0 − T i0 ‖2 (5.4)
+ ‖I1(1)− T 11 ‖2 − ‖I1(1)− T i1 ‖2 (5.5)
+
n−1∑
j=2
‖Xj − T 1j ‖2 −
n−1∑
j=2
‖Xj − T ij ‖2 (5.6)
Note that I1(0) is calculated according to Equation 5.1. According to
Equation 5.4, we have the same number of linear equations but one less
unknown point to solve because that point is interpolated. This technique
can be generalized to further reduce the number of unknown points. To
solve the system of linear equations, the number of unknown variables must
be equal to the number of equations. Thus the number of interpolated points
depends on the number of known trajectories.
According to Equation 5.2, any trajectory satisfying δ21−δ2i ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
is a candidate trajectory. Different dissimilarity matrices may have same
δ21 − δ2i ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} but when only distance differences are preserved,
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candidate trajectories to all different dissimilarity matrices will be the same
although the target trajectories are different for each dissimilarity matrix.
Thus, a candidate set of distance difference preserving trajectories does not
necessarily demonstrate the target trajectory. We can be sure about our can-
didate trajectories if we preserve the pairwise distances instead of distance
differences.
Equation 5.2 preserves distance differences but a distance preserving
method can also be derived from the same formula with a new settings.
If we have 2n known trajectories, 2n − 1 equations are formed with hyper-
lateration mentioned in Equation 5.2 so that 2n−1 coordinates can be solved.
Assume 2n − 1 coordinates are solved where trajectory has 2n coordinates.
This means, the last coordinate cannot be solved due to lack of information,
but all other coordinates can be expressed in terms of the last coordinate,
tn. We re-write all ti’s in terms of tn.
i=2n−1∑
i=1
(2ai − 2bi)ti + (2an − 2bn)tn = dbt − dat +
i=2n∑
i=1
a2i − b2i (5.7)
i=2n−1∑
i=1
(2ai − 2bi)ti = dbt − dat +
[
i=2n∑
i=1
a2i − b2i
]
− (2an − 2bn)tn (5.8)
where dxy represents Euclidean square distance (see Equation 3.5) in-
between trajectory X and trajectory Y .
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Equation 5.8 can be seen as a matrix operation thus system of equations
can easily be solved. This is a matrix operation of Ax = b, where x represents
all the ti’s, A is the (2ai−2bi) for each ti and right hand side of the equation
is simply the b. To solve all ti’s, multiply both sides with A−1 so that it
becomes A−1Ax = A−1b hence x = A−1b. Here the key point is, the matrix
denoted as A must be an invertible matrix. A should be invertible so that the
system of equations can be solved and a real root can be found. Note that in
this system of equations, the root found will be the tn, the last coordinate of
the unknown trajectory. All the ti’s are expressed in terms of tn so whenever
a root is found in this system of equations, the tn is found automatically. All
other coordinates are in terms of tn so they are found too. To solve Equation
5.8, right hand side of the equation is divided into two main components
since it is in the form of x − y where x = dbt − dat + [
∑i=2n
i=1 a
2
i − b2i ] and
y = (2an−2bn)tn. Hence we produce two equations to be solved and real ti’s
will be in the form of their outputs.
i=2n−1∑
i=1
(2ai − 2bi)ei = dbt − dat +
[
i=2n∑
i=1
a2i − b2i
]
(5.9)
i=2n−1∑
i=1
(2ai − 2bi)fi = (2an − 2bn)tn (5.10)
Equations 5.9 and 5.10 are in the form of Ae = x and Af = y. Calculating
Equation 5.9 and Equation 5.10 as separate matrix operations yields two
different solutions to be combined to find real tn. Solving this system of
equations as matrix operation is explained above. When both Equation 5.9
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and Equation 5.10 and solved, Equation 5.9 yields ei , ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, ....., 2n−1}
and Equation 5.10 yields fi , ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, ....., 2n− 1} . Since the right hand
side of the Equation 5.8 is in form of x− y the real ti’s will be in the form of
ti = ei − fitn, ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, ....., 2n− 1} (5.11)
All ti’s according to Equation 5.11 are constructed. Since all ti’s are in
terms of tn that we want to find, we can plug these ti’s into the distance cal-
culation (see Section 3.2) between any known trajectory, k and the unknown
trajectory. Distance between k and t is as follows:
i=2n∑
i=1
(ki − ti)2 = dkt →
i=2n∑
i=1
(ki − ti)2 − dkt = 0 (5.12)
Plugging Equation 5.11 into Equation 5.12 results in
[
i=2n−1∑
i=1
f 2i t
2
n + (2kifi − 2eifi)tn + (ki − ei)2
]
+ (k2n − 2kntn + t2n) − dkt = 0
(5.13)
The roots of Equation 5.13 can be solved by solving quadratic equations.
Solving quadratic equations and finding real roots are explained in [5]. Since
Equation 5.13 is a quadratic equation in the form of ax2+bx+c = 0, the real
root will be tn. Since tn is found, the coordinates, ti’s , that are expressed in
terms of tn’s are also found.
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The real roots, which will be tn can be found using the formula below.
x1 =
−b− sgn(b)√b2 − 4ac
2a
(5.14)
x2 =
c
ax1
(5.15)
where sgn denotes sign function which returns the sign of the given ar-
gument (i.e if it is positive then it returns 1, else it returns -1).
5.4 Our Method
5.4.1 The Method and Confidence of an Area
Our approach is based on hyper-lateration (see Section 5.3.2) together with
interpolation (see Section 5.3.1). The adversary, has a set of trajectories,
say k trajectories, with s sample points. S/he computes k − 1 equations
by using the Equation 5.2. According to Equation 5.2, distance differences
are preserved between the candidate trajectory and the known trajectories
regardless of how close the resulting trajectory is to the target trajectory. If
k = s, hyper-lateration will result the exact unknown trajectory and we are
done. When k < s, it can only solve up to k − 1 coordinates. Due to lack
of information, we can not find an exact solution. Under the assumption of
constant sampling rate mentioned in Section 3.1, we use the interpolation
technique (see Section 5.3.1) for the rest of the points. This solvable k − 1
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coordinates are called main coordinates. Two main coordinates (x and y co-
ordinates) forms a main point. We re-write the interpolated points in terms
of their main points hence when they are solved, candidate trajectory is au-
tomatically formed. When k − 1 coordinates are solved, there are s− k − 1
coordinates needed to be interpolated. Those interpolated points are dis-
tributed randomly among the segments of the candidate trajectory. Those
segments are formed by the main points of the candidate trajectory. In each
run of finding candidates (i.e each run of the attack), different number of
interpolated points are added to the segments hence a different candidate
trajectory is formed. When k = s, target trajectory is exactly found. Oth-
erwise, we measure the success of the found trajectory because there are
many candidates which satisfies all the properties. As the number of known
trajectories by the adversary decreases, the number of candidate trajectories
increases. If the information is very limited, so that the number of coordi-
nates to be interpolated is very high compared to the number of coordinates
that can be solved, the attack even becomes senseless. Success rate is mea-
sured as in Section 3.4.2. Our method gives the best possible results in terms
of distances because pairwise distances are preserved so mathematically any
candidate trajectory found with this method is no less likely to be the target
trajectory than any other candidate trajectory.
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Figure 12: Candidate Generation
When k < s there are more than one solution to the equation system
where each solution is a candidate. Each solution is mathematically identi-
cal to each other within given properties, so the known distances, which is
the only information the adversary have. In Figure 12, candidate trajectory
generation is shown. With the limited information we have, we can solve up
to k − 1 coordinates ((k − 1)/2 main points) which are the denoted by the
black points. In between two main points, we have a segment where we can
put a number of interpolated points which are denoted with grey points. Ev-
ery segment can have a different number of interpolated points depending on
the distribution of the interpolated points. We distribute a random number
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of interpolated points to each segment so the total number of sample points
will be equal to the total number of sample points of the other trajectories
in the dataset. This way, candidate trajectory has same number of sam-
ple points as the target trajectory. As seen in Figure 12, when the number
of interpolated points of the segment changes, a new candidate trajectory
originates. Each candidate is equally likely to be the target trajectory even
though they may not be the target trajectory. Because all candidates sat-
isfies the known distances property. Distances from those candidates to the
known trajectories are equal to each other. Moreover the distances between
a candidate and the known trajectories are equal to the distances from the
target trajectory to known trajectories.
Candidate trajectories, c1, c2, c3 in Figure 12 are all indistinguishable in
terms of pairwise distances and visually different trajectories. This set of
candidate trajectories is called candidate trajectory set. We assume that
the candidate set eventually contain the target trajectory when all possible
solutions are generated. While each candidate in this set is a possible target
trajectory, the area covered by these candidates is possibly the area where
the actual target trajectory passes through. We do not only find a good
solution but also compute the confidence on the solutions. Confidence of an
area is the ratio of the number of candidate trajectories which passes through
a specific area, or a sub-trajectory, or a sample point in the trajectory (say lth
sample point) to the cardinality of the candidate trajectory set. Confidence
of an area around the sample point l , denoted as sl is calculated as follows:
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Cl =
# of candidates passing sl
cardinality of candidate trajectory set
(5.16)
For instance, in Figure 13, assume that we have 5 candidates, namely
c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, for a target trajectory, t, each of which has different success
rate according to Success Rate 2 in 3.14. Consider the area 1m2 around
sl, which is marked in a green rectangle denoted as Al. After examining
the candidates, c1, c2, c3, c4 are passing through Al while c5 is not passing
through so 4 out of 5 candidates pass through Al, hence we conclude that
the target trajectory, t, passes through Al with confidence 4/5 = 80% . This
section aims to find the target trajectory and discuss the confidence of areas
that are possibly to be used by the target trajectory.
The power of this method is based on how successful the interpolation
is done over the trajectory. If the target trajectory is following up a linear
path, so the interpolation works great and we may have very high success
rates. At least one candidate trajectory will be close to the target trajectory.
Otherwise, the success rate may be very low or even becomes 0.
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Figure 13: Confidence of an Area
5.4.2 Evaluations and Experimental Results
This method is tested on a synthetic data that we created. Our aim is
to show that this method works and present the confidence of the areas
where the unknown trajectory likely to pass through. Our experiments show
that, all the candidate trajectories we found have the same distances given
in the dissimilarity matrix. The dissimilarity matrix contains the pairwise
distances between the known trajectories and the target trajectory. This
makes them mathematically indistinguishable from each other and from the
target trajectory. In Figure 14, success rate versus the number of known
trajectories is shown. According to Success Rate 2 defined in 3.14, average
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success rate of the whole attack is 0, 53 when the α = 20. Success rate was
calculated, for a fixed target trajectory which has 20 coordinates.
Figure 14: Success Rate vs no of known trajectories
5.5 Discussions
In this section, we present a method for finding unknown trajectories with a
limited information such as a very few known trajectories and their pairwise
distances to other trajectories. Our method finds candidates which is the
best possible candidates and they are mathematically same and no less likely
than the real target trajectory because the pairwise distances among them
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are preserved. Using hyper-lateration technique needs 2n + 1 trajectories
to be known beforehand while our method can decrease that number up to
40% depending how linear the target trajectory is. Linear structure among
the sub-parts of the trajectories is the key part in our method because we fill
those missing information with the interpolated points so that if the unknown
trajectory has a linear sub-structures, the interpolated points that we placed
among the candidate will conform to the real target and the rest of the points
are solved because we had those information from the system of equations.
In other words, assuming we have 50 trajectories, we calculate up to 49
coordinates while unknown target trajectory has 90 coordinates, we place
90 − 49 = 41 coordinates which are produced by interpolation technique
and distributed randomly across the sub-segments of the candidate that we
create and treat as the unknown trajectory. Due to the time constraints,
calculating confidence of the sample points or an area is leaved as a future
work which we are currently working on. Our method is sensitive to the noise
can be presented in dissimilarity matrix because a change in the distances will
result in candidates which are wrongly placed but still preserve the pairwise
distances which contains noise. Another future work can be strengthen this
method against noise in the dissimilarity matrix.
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6 Comparisons
In this thesis, we presented two attack methods which reveal private trajecto-
ries using background information. The ultimate aim in both of the methods
is to show privacy leaks. However these methods differ not only in the way
of computations but also in their settings.
In the first method presented in Section 4, the aim is to recover the private
trajectory. This method exhausts various kinds of background information
and results in one arbitrary solution with a high success rate possible. This
solution may not be the real target trajectory but due to limited information,
it is the best solution so far and satisfy all available information about the
target trajectory. Other possible solutions are not calculated in this method.
This is a heuristic based method and exhausts the given background infor-
mation. It also works when there is noise in the dissimilarity matrix and can
even handle complex real world datasets like the Milan dataset. Moreover it
can use almost any kind of background information.
In the second method discussed in Section 5, the aim is to recover the
private trajectory by calculating all possible candidate trajectories satisfying
the given information and further discuss about confidence of the selected ar-
eas. This method exhausts only the dissimilarity matrix and a set of known
trajectories. Using the available but limited information to the adversary,
possible solutions (i.e the candidates) are calculated and a candidate trajec-
tory set is formed. The real target trajectory may or may not be in this set
but eventually if all the candidates are generated, then the target trajectory
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will be in this set. Calculating all the candidates may be infeasible if the
information is very limited. Although we may not find the target trajectory,
using the possible candidate trajectories, we can discuss about the areas
where the target trajectory passes through. This method is based on linear
interpolation which works better if the sample points in the trajectories are
close like in the Athens dataset. Moreover hyper-lateration is sensitive to
noise and we do not expect high success rate in noisy and complex datasets
like the Milan dataset. This method needs more available information com-
pared to first method to yield good success rates.
In both of the methods, the key point determining the success rate is the
available information to the adversary. Exhausting limited information yields
more than one solution because theoretically finding the exact solution needs
2n + 1 known trajectories. When the available information is high, success
rates in both attack methods are high too.
64
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we studied privacy leaks that may occur in case of distance
preserving data transformations on spatio-temporal datasets, especially in
trajectory publishing. We presented two methods, which are based on avail-
able background information, and a dissimilarity matrix to show that shar-
ing dissimilarity matrices for data mining is not exactly a privacy preserving
solution. Background information is in terms of known distances, average
and maximum speed. The only given information is the dissimilarity ma-
trix which is released for data mining purposes. Speed limit is not given
information though adversary can easily learn it because it is a set of rules
that defines the maximum speed on different types of roads and the average
speed can also be computed according to traffic density of the roads. In
fact, traffic density applications are available on the internet for many cities
around the world so the average speed can be obtained from such informa-
tion sources. Our methods demonstrate that with limited information, the
adversary can precisely find the target trajectory which is clearly a privacy
leak in dissimilarity matrix release.
In the first method presented in Section 4, our contribution is to demon-
strate the privacy leak in dissimilarity matrices with a very limited informa-
tion compared to hyper-lateration attack discussed in [51]. We also utilized
other properties of trajectories such as average and maximum speed and
show their effect on the success rate of the attack. We use the speed limit as
background information, but the attack model we propose is general enough
so that any kind of background information about trajectories with continu-
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ous properties could be the input. Our method is optimal in the sense that
it will eventually find a candidate which exhausts all the information avail-
able about the unknown trajectory. The experiments show that, with known
trajectories we can find very precise candidates with a high success rate.
In the second method presented in Section 5, we demonstrate an advanced
version of hyper-lateration attack which requires less information than the
original one. Although 2n + 1 known trajectories are needed for a perfect
attack, we are still able to find privacy leaks with limited information. In
case the number of known trajectories is smaller than 2n+1, we use an inter-
polation technique to infer some of the points in terms of the known points.
Contribution of this method is not limited to privacy leak demonstration but
we also discuss the confidence of an area that target trajectory is possibly
passes through. Since the background information is limited, there can be
a number of candidate trajectories. The area that the real target trajectory
passes can be discovered from the candidates by looking at the intersections
of their surrounding areas.
The methods presented in this thesis show that privacy-preserving spatio-
temporal data mining using data transformation techniques may not be an
appropriate solution. This shows that privacy in spatio-temporal data mining
context needs further research against background information-based attacks.
In this thesis, we address the privacy leaks in trajectory data publishing and
address the weakness of dissimilarity matrix release in terms of privacy. As
a future work, we plan to study the effect of noise. We are currently looking
at confidence of an area discussed in the second method. We believe that
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revealing location information of individuals is as important as revealing the
whole target trajectory. In the first method, we aim to reveal the trajectory
without considering the sensitive locations that the person may pass through
while in the second method we address the need of a measure to calculate
how likely the person passes through a selected location.
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